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i. intrOdUCtiOn
 Constitutional history is a human subject dealing with human creations—ideas, 
institutions, doctrines, customs, usages, and the enduring problems to which they 
respond. James F. Simon, a master of historical storytelling, has never forgotten that 
truth, and his readers are the luckier for it.
 In a variation on Jim Simon’s trilogy examining the turbulent relationships 
between a President and a Chief Justice,1 this article examines a complicated story of 
judicial appointments focusing on the problems that President John Adams faced in 
juggling as many as four Chief Justices in three months in 1800–1801, when the task 
of naming a new Chief Justice confronted him.2 To complicate matters for him, his 
need to choose came at a time when the early Supreme Court of the United States 
lacked the authority and dignity that it enjoys today. This story also dramatizes the 
experimental nature of the American constitutional system, and politics under that 
system, in its first years. Consider, for example, the use of a sitting Chief Justice as 
leader of an American diplomatic mission, or the collision of partisan politics with 
the demands of administering a system of federal courts that most Americans viewed 
with suspicion and uncertainty.
 By focusing on John Adams rather than on John Marshall—on the appointer 
rather than the appointee—this article differs from most accounts of Adams’s 
eventual choice of Marshall to become the nation’s fourth (fifth?) Chief Justice. Yet 
it is only when we study the appointment of Marshall to the Chief Justiceship by 
reference to President Adams’s struggle with the task of naming a new Chief Justice, 
by setting that struggle firmly within its historical and political contexts, that we can 
understand the ordeal that Adams faced and the solution that he found to it.
ii. sEtting and COntEXt
 The setting in which Adams wrestled with this problem was Washington, D.C., 
the new permanent federal capital. Washington was far from being the august 
metropolis envisioned by its creators—it existed more in architectural drawings and 
planners’ hopes than in reality. Work on the Capitol building had barely begun; only 
that part of the building housing the original chamber of the House of Representatives 
1. See James F. Simon, FDR and Chief Justice Hughes: The President, the Supreme Court, and 
the Epic Battle over the New Deal (2012); James F. Simon, Lincoln and Chief Justice Taney: 
Slavery, Secession, and the President’s War Powers (2006); James F. Simon, What Kind of 
Nation: Thomas Jefferson, John Marshall, and the Epic Struggle to Create the United 
States (2002).
2. I acknowledge my profound debt to the late Kathryn Turner Preyer (1925–2005), whose 1960 article, 
The Appointment of Chief Justice Marshall, was a pioneering exploration of this subject. See Kathryn 
Turner, The Appointment of Chief Justice Marshall, 17 Wm. & Mary Q. 143 (1960), reprinted in 
Blackstone in America: Selected Essays of Kathryn Preyer 39 (Mary Sarah Bilder, Maeva 
Marcus & R. Kent Newmyer eds., 2009) [hereinafter Preyer Essays]. For a useful, distilled treatment 
of the Supreme Court Judiciary before Chief Justice Marshall’s appointment, see Natalie Wexler, The 
Chief Justice from a Historical Perspective: In the Beginning: The First Three Chief Justices, 154 U. Pa. L. 
Rev. 1373 (2006). See id. at 1379–96 for Wexler’s version of the events recounted here. See infra, text at 
notes 21–23 and 36–40, for an explanation of why I speak of “as many as” four Chief Justices.
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was standing and in use. The Executive Mansion was large, cold, and drafty—First 
Lady Abigail Adams hung her laundry to dry in the cavernous East Room. Visitors 
from European nations viewed with derision the infant capital of a fragile federal 
republic, with its gargantuan public buildings and building sites speckling a wilderness, 
linked only by muddy footpaths instead of clean, dry, paved roads.3 Though seemingly 
desolate, the capital was far from quiet. Politicians were wrangling bitterly over a host 
of issues, including, but by no means limited to, those thrown up by the elections of 
1800 and the bitter, vituperative campaign that had preceded them.
 In December 1800, President John Adams was sitting in the metaphorical eye of 
this political hurricane—a lame-duck and painfully self-conscious chief executive.4 
Having stood for a second term as candidate (with Charles C. Pinckney of South 
Carolina) of the Federalist partisan alliance, he had suffered a close but decisive 
defeat at the hands of the Republican ticket of Thomas Jefferson and Aaron Burr. 
The principal reason for his defeat was the shattering of the fragile bands holding 
together two contentious and mutually suspicious groups of Federalist politicians—
moderate Federalists loyal to President Adams and more conservative Federalists 
supporting former Treasury Secretary Alexander Hamilton.5 The resulting 
Republican victory left all the Federalists downcast, demoralized, and all too inclined 
to blame one another for their plight.
 The only thing resolved by the presidential election of 1800 was that John Adams 
would be going home to Braintree, Massachusetts in March 1801. Who would 
become President was the subject of frantic and angry politicking both in the capital 
and throughout the United States. Under the original version of the Electoral 
College, the mechanism specified in the Constitution for choosing the President and 
the vice president every four years, electors cast two electoral votes apiece, except that 
they could not vote for two people from the same state. Although the party caucuses 
in Congress that selected the candidates had preferences for which should be 
President and which should be vice president, the Electoral College threw all the 
candidates into the same arena, vying for the same office. The candidate receiving 
the greatest number of electoral votes (so long as it was a majority of the votes cast) 
would become President, and the first runner-up would become vice president.6
 The problem was that the Constitution’s original method of choosing the 
President and vice president never made allowances for the development of loosely 
3. See generally Kenneth R. Bowling, The Creation of Washington, D.C.: The Idea and the 
Location of the Nation’s Capital (1991); Kenneth R. Bowling, Creating the Federal City, 
1774–1800: Potomac Fever (1988).
4. On Adams, see Gilbert Chinard, Honest John Adams (1935); John E. Ferling, John Adams: A 
Life (1992); James E. Grant, John Adams, Party of One (2005); John Adams and the Founding 
of the Republic (Richard Alan Ryerson ed., 2001).
5. On this division, see Manning J. Dauer, The Adams Federalists (1968), and Stephen G. Kurtz, 
The Presidency of John Adams: The Collapse of Federalism 1796–1800 (Univ. Pa. Press rev. ed. 
1957).
6. U.S. Const. art. II, § 1, cl. 3, superseded by U.S. Const. amend. XII.
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organized partisan alliances operating on the national political stage.7 In 1796, this 
arrangement had led to an embarrassing and uncomfortable result: the victor, John 
Adams, became President, and his chief rival, Thomas Jefferson, who trailed him by 
only three electoral votes, became vice president. In 1800, the contest was even more 
fraught, and the results were rife with the potential for political, even constitutional, 
crisis. Jefferson and Burr tied for first place, each receiving seventy-three electoral 
votes to Adams’s sixty-five (and sixty-four votes cast for Pinckney). The Federalists 
also lost control of both Houses of Congress to the Republicans. And yet, despite 
their rout at the polls, the governmental calendar set forth in the Constitution and 
federal law kept the lame-duck House of Representatives, with a fractious and 
demoralized Federalist majority, in office until inauguration day, March 4, 1801, 
giving it the power and responsibility to decide who would become President. 
Although the balloting would not begin until February 1801, politicking over the 
electoral deadlock between Jefferson and Burr was already underway.8
 Meanwhile, Adams sat in the Executive Mansion, alone and lonely, wrestling 
with a tangle of constitutional, political, administrative, diplomatic, and national 
security problems facing the nation in the closing months of his presidency. One 
such issue was the struggle by Congress to frame new legislation reworking the 
federal judiciary, responding to over a decade of lobbying by the Justices of the 
Supreme Court and to the changed political context created by the results of the 
1800 elections—but many other unresolved problems confronted the federal 
government, leaving Adams with a desk piled high with correspondence to review 
and decisions to make.
iii. adaMs and ChiEf JUstiCE ELLsWOrth
 Above all other matters, Adams was awaiting news from a diplomatic mission, 
led by Chief Justice Oliver Ellsworth, seeking an end to the nation’s undeclared 
naval war with France—a war that had resulted from a series of diplomatic clashes 
dating from the earliest months of Adams’s presidency, had generated domestic 
7. On the unsatisfactory original version of the electoral college, see R.B. Bernstein, The Constitution as an 
Exploding Cigar and Other “Historian’s Heresies” About a Constitutional Orthodoxy, 55 N.Y.L. Sch. L. Rev. 
1073, 1088–89 & nn.67–72 (2010–2011).
8. For the best account of this traumatic election, see Joanne B. Freeman, Affairs of Honor: National 
Politics in the New Republic 199–261 (2001). See also Susan Dunn, Jefferson’s Second 
Revolution: The Election Crisis of 1800 and the Triumph of Republicanism (2004); John 
Ferling, Adams vs. Jefferson: The Tumultuous Election of 1800 (2004); Edward J. Larson, A 
Magnificent Catastrophe: The Tumultuous Election of 1800, America’s First Presidential 
Campaign (2007); Peter S. Onuf, Jefferson’s Empire: The Language of American Nationhood 
80–108 (2000); The Revolution of 1800: Democracy, Race, and the New Republic (James 
Horn, Jan Ellen Lewis & Peter S. Onuf eds., 2002); Bernard A. Weisberger, America Afire: 
Jefferson, Adams, and the Revolutionary Election of 1800 (2000). Older works include Daniel 
Sisson, The American Revolution of 1800 (1974); Frank van der Linden, The Turning Point: 
Jefferson’s Battle for the Presidency (Fulcrum Publ’g 2000) (1962). The latest addition to the 
literature as of this writing is James Roger Sharp, The Deadlocked Election of 1800: Jefferson, 
Burr, and the Union in the Balance (2010).
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controversies that bedeviled Adams’s administration, and ultimately had contributed 
to Adams’s defeat in 1800.9
 Though the choice of a sitting Chief Justice to conduct a diplomatic mission 
might cause modern Americans to raise their eyebrows, Adams had followed 
precedent in asking Ellsworth to lead this peace mission. In 1794, President George 
Washington had asked Chief Justice John Jay to negotiate a treaty with Great Britain, 
hoping that, as a veteran diplomat, Jay could resolve outstanding differences between 
the United States and its former mother country.10 Jay’s Treaty did ease tensions 
between the two nations, but at the cost of severe domestic political turbulence.
 That two Chief Justices served on diplomatic missions in the 1790s reflected the 
conflicting perceptions of the Supreme Court in its early years; the Justices often 
were informal advisors to the executive branch, sometimes even accepting statutory 
executive responsibilities (such as deciding pension claims by Revolutionary War 
veterans) by designation of Congress.11 These missions also reflected the Court’s lack 
of pressing business, which in turn indicated that the Supreme Court as an institution 
and the Justices as individuals had at best uncertain stature in the public’s eyes.12
 In the middle of December, the good news for which Adams had been waiting 
finally arrived, though it came too late to save his Presidency: As reported in a letter 
dated October 16, 1800, and marked by Adams as received on December 15, 
Ellsworth and his colleagues had negotiated the Convention of 1800, which ended 
hostilities and resolved outstanding differences between France and the United 
States. In honor of this news, Adams renamed his home Peacefield; in 1815, he 
declared to the Massachusetts politician James Lloyd that his epitaph should read, 
9. See Alexander DeConde, The Quasi-War: The Politics and Diplomacy of the Undeclared 
War with France 1797–1801 (1966); Marie-Jeanne Rossignol, The Nationalist Ferment: The 
Origin of U.S. Foreign Policy 1789–1812 (Lillian A. Parrott trans., 2004); 4 The Documentary 
History of the Supreme Court of the United States 1789–1800, at 245 (Maeva Marcus et al. 
eds., 1992) [hereinafter DHSC]; Wexler, supra note 2, at 1401–06.
10. Samuel Flagg Bemis, Jay’s Treaty: A Study in Commerce and Diplomacy (Yale Univ. Press 
1962) (1923); Jerald A. Combs, The Jay Treaty: Political Battleground of the Founding 
Fathers (1970); Todd Estes, The Jay Treaty Debate, Public Opinion, and the Evolution of 
Early American Political Culture (2006). On Jay’s mission, see Walter Stahr, John Jay: 
Founding Father 313–38 (2005); 1 DHSC, supra note 9, at 7; 4 DHSC, supra note 9, at 243–45 
(discussing Jay’s mission and its consequences); Wexler, supra note 2, at 1401–06.
11. See, e.g., Stewart Jay, Most Humble Servants: The Advisory Role of Early Judges (1997); Ene 
Sirvet & R.B. Bernstein, John Jay, Judicial Independence, and Advising Coordinate Branches, 21 J. Sup. Ct. 
Hist. 23 (1996); Wexler, supra note 2, at 1396–1406. In Hayburn’s Case, 2 U.S. 408 (1792), the Court 
confronted, but did not have to resolve, a conflict between circuit court decisions on a federal statute 
giving the judges of the circuit court the added responsibility of administering pension claims by 
Revolutionary War veterans. See Julius Goebel, Jr., Antecedents and Beginnings to 1801, in 1 
The Oliver Wendell Holmes Devise History of the Supreme Court of the United States 
580–86 (Paul A. Freund ed., 1971). 
12. On the early Supreme Court, see generally DHSC, supra note 9; William R. Casto, The Supreme 
Court in the Early Republic: The Chief Justiceships of John Jay and Oliver Ellsworth 
(1995); Seriatim: The Supreme Court Before John Marshall (Scott Douglas Gerber ed., 1998) 
[hereinafter Seriatim]; Goebel, supra note 11; Wexler, supra note 2, passim.
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“Here lies John Adams, who took upon himself the responsibility of the peace with 
France in the year 1800.”13
 Ellsworth’s letter brought news not just of an old set of problems solved but also 
of a new problem to be solved. He informed Adams that, because of his fragile health 
(specifically, the excruciating ailment that he called “the gravel,” now recognized as 
kidney or bladder stones), he was resigning as Chief Justice, effective immediately:
Constantly aff licted with the gravel, and the gout in my kidnies, the 
unfortunate fruit of sufferings at sea, and by a winters journey through Spain, 
I am not in a condition to undertake a voyage to America at this late season 
of the year; nor if I were there, would I be able to discharge my official duties. 
I must therefore pray you, Sir, to accept this my resignation of the office of 
Chief Justice of the United States.14
 In naming a new Chief Justice, Adams would choose a successor to a man who 
had been a moderately successful Chief Justice since his confirmation in 1796. As 
Adams considered the choices that Ellsworth’s resignation placed before him, he 
knew that the Supreme Court and its Chief Justice were of uncertain value and 
dignity in the new nation’s legal and political worlds. These problems plagued the 
Court when Ellsworth became Chief Justice, and they still were aff licting the Court 
when Adams received Ellsworth’s resignation.
 In 1796, Ellsworth became Chief Justice because of his political eminence as a 
framer of the Constitution, as a leading Federalist senator from Connecticut, and as 
a designer of the federal court system created by the Judiciary Act of 1789.15 Such an 
appointment, from our perspective, seems natural and easy. Yet it is largely forgotten 
that President Washington’s appointment of Ellsworth was his third attempt to fill 
the Chief Justiceship in the space of a year.
 The Court’s and President Washington’s troubles began in the spring of 1795, 
when, on returning home after negotiating the Jay Treaty with Great Britain, Chief 
Justice John Jay discovered that he had been elected governor of New York—a post 
that he had sought in 1792 while presiding over the Court, and for which his friends 
13. Grant, supra note 4, at 383 (quoting letter from John Adams to James Lloyd (Jan. 1815), in 10 Charles 
Francis Adams, The Works of John Adams, Esq., Second President of the United States 113 
(1856)).
14. Letter from Oliver Ellsworth to John Adams (Oct. 16, 1800), in 1 DHSC, supra note 9, at 123. On the 
perennial question of whether the correct title is “Chief Justice of the United States” (which seems to 
have been standard since 1874, though used on occasion before 1874) or “Chief Justice of the United 
States Supreme Court” (which seems to have been standard from 1790 through 1874, although with 
variants cropping up), see 1 DHSC, supra note 9, at 173 n.6 and sources and authorities cited, including 
Josiah M. Daniel, III, “Chief Justice of the United States”: History and Historiography of the Title, 1983 Sup. 
Ct. Hist. Soc. Y.B. 109–12. I am indebted to Josiah M. Daniel, III, for this reference.
15. On Ellsworth, see William R. Casto, Oliver Ellsworth and the Creation of the Federal 
Republic (1997); Casto, supra note 12; and William R. Casto, Oliver Ellsworth: “I Have Sought the 
Felicity and Glory of Your Administration,” in Seriatim, supra note 12, at 292–321. For documentation of 
Ellsworth’s appointment, see 1 DHSC, supra note 9, at 120–23. For a very old treatment that still has 
useful information, see 2 Henry Flanders, The Lives and Times of the Chief Justices of the 
Supreme Court of the United States 55–276 (T. & J.W. Johnson & Co. 1881) (1875).
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had backed him without his knowledge in 1795.16 On June 28, 1795, he resigned 
from the Supreme Court to accept his election. To succeed Jay, Washington first 
nominated John Rutledge of South Carolina, a distinguished but fiery politician who 
had been an important delegate to the Federal Convention and a leading advocate of 
the Constitution in South Carolina’s 1788 ratifying convention. Rutledge also had 
served brief ly as an Associate Justice of the Supreme Court from 1789 to 1791; 
although he had presided over circuit courts in the Southern circuit, he never joined 
his colleagues for sessions of the Supreme Court, and in 1791 he resigned to become 
Chief Justice of South Carolina’s Court of Common Pleas and Sessions.17
 Because Congress was in recess when Jay submitted his resignation, Washington 
gave Rutledge a recess appointment, confident that the Senate would confirm him 
when it reconvened later that year. Rutledge took office pursuant to that appointment 
on June 30, 1795. However, the abrasive Rutledge damaged his candidacy within 
three weeks of taking office by making a public speech in Charleston, South Carolina 
on July 16, 1795, against ratifying the Jay Treaty. News of Rutledge’s address, and 
criticism of Rutledge for making it, soon spread through the nation’s newspapers.18 
Rutledge’s imprudent intervention into the ongoing political controversy over the Jay 
Treaty, combined with rumors about his mental instability, sank his nomination; after 
Washington submitted Rutledge’s name to the Senate on December 10, 1795, the 
Senators rejected Rutledge on December 15 by a vote of fourteen to ten, the first time 
that the Senate had rejected a Supreme Court nominee. Before Rutledge received 
word of his rejection by the Senate, he had suffered a breakdown of his health while 
performing his circuit-riding duties; distraught at this evidence that he could no 
longer carry out his judicial duties, he attempted suicide by drowning at Camden, 
South Carolina, on his return journey to his home, and then made another attempt 
after returning home. These two attempts by Rutledge to take his own life confirmed 
the contemporary rumors that he was psychologically unfit to preside over the Court. 
16. See Stahr, supra note 10, at 334–35 (discussing his election in 1795), 339–64 (discussing his 
governorship). On Jay, see generally Frank Monaghan, John Jay (1937); Richard B. Morris, John 
Jay, the Nation, and the Court (1967); Stahr, supra note 10, passim. For a more astringent 
perspective on Jay, see Sandra Frances VanBurkleo, “Honour, Justice, and Interest” John Jay’s Republican 
Politics and Statesmanship on the Federal Bench, in Seriatim, supra note 12, at 26–69. For a very old 
treatment that still has useful information, see Flanders, supra note 15, at 19. For documentation of 
Jay’s appointment in 1789, see 1 DHSC, supra note 9, at 9. For discussion of Jay’s appointment, see 
Stahr, supra note 10, at 271–73, and sources cited therein.
17. On Rutledge, see James Haw, John & Edward Rutledge of South Carolina (1997); James Haw, 
John Rutledge: Distinction and Declension, in Seriatim, supra note 12, at 70–96. (There is also a semi-
fictional study that is not recommended: Richard Barry, Mr. Rutledge of South Carolina 
(1942)). Also see the much older treatment in Flanders, supra note 15, at 431–645, and see the 
documentation of Rutledge’s 1789 appointment in 1 DHSC, supra note 9, at 19–23.
18. For documentation of this controversial speech and reactions to it, see 1 DHSC, supra note 9, at 765–
828; George S. McCowan, Jr., Chief Justice Rutledge and the Jay Treaty, 62 S.C. Hist. Mag. 10–23 
(1961).
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Still apparently unaware of his rejection by the Senate, he sent President Washington 
a resignation letter on December 28, 1795.19
 Trying to put the Rutledge debacle behind him, Washington next turned his 
attention to the Court’s senior Associate Justice, William Cushing of Massachusetts, 
who was renowned for his judicial experience and for his solid, reliable commitment 
to the Federalist cause.20 Appointed by President Washington to the Court in 1789, 
Cushing was a learned and respected jurist who had presided over his state’s highest 
court for over a decade and had played a key role in Massachusetts’s ratification of 
the Constitution in 1788 and in the state’s abolition of slavery.21 When Washington 
submitted his name to the Senate, on January 26, 1796, Cushing won easy, swift, 
and unanimous confirmation that same day, and Washington executed his judicial 
commission as Chief Justice on January 27. Oddly enough, tradition has it that 
Washington never informed Cushing of his plan to name him as the nation’s new 
Chief Justice, and that somehow Cushing never learned that the Senate had 
confirmed the nomination. Again according to tradition, the first news that Cushing 
had of his elevation came at a state dinner at the President’s house on January 26, 
when Washington announced that the new Chief Justice would sit at his right at the 
dinner. Whether this tradition is true or false, after a few days of consideration, 
Cushing wrote to President Washington on February 2, 1796, declining his 
appointment as Chief Justice, returning his commission, and asking that he be 
allowed to remain as an Associate Justice, citing his frail health as his reason for 
declining his promotion. The records are unclear whether Cushing actually presided 
over the Court as Chief Justice pursuant to his appointment before declining the 
office; even had he presided over the Court at that time, he would have done so as 
senior Associate Justice because of the vacancy in the Chief Justiceship, as he had 
previously done while Chief Justice Jay was absent from the bench on his diplomatic 
mission to Britain. The Cushing incident, a puzzling byway in the history of the 
early Court, became yet another source of frustration for President Washington.22
19. See Haw, supra note 17, at 70–88; see also Wexler, supra note 2, at 1383–86.
20. On Cushing, see Ross E. Davies, William Cushing, Chief Justice of the United States, 37 U. Tol. L. Rev. 
597 (2006); Scott Douglas Gerber, Deconstructing William Cushing, in Seriatim, supra note 12, at 
97–125 (citing—and severely criticizing—John D. Cushing, A Revolutionary Conservative: The Public 
Life of William Cushing 1732–1810 (1960) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Clark University), and 
correctly reporting it to be the only extended modern treatment of its subject); Wexler, supra note 2, at 
1386–89. See also the much older treatment in Flanders, supra note 15, at 11–51. For documentation 
of Cushing’s appointment, see 1 DHSC, supra note 9, at 28–30.
21. Gerber, supra note 20, at 115–17.
22. For documentation of Cushing’s 1796 appointment to the Chief Justiceship, see 1 DHSC, supra note 9, at 
101–04. In the most detailed and challenging analysis, Ross Davies stresses what in later times would be 
profound irregularities about Cushing’s acceptance and then rejection of his appointment as Chief Justice 
accompanied by his decision to return to his duties as an Associate Justice. See Davies, supra note 20, 
passim. Neither DHSC nor Gerber addresses these issues. See William Cushing: Appointment as Associate 
Justice in 1789, in 1 DHSC, supra note 9, at 26, 27 n.19, 101–04; Gerber, supra note 20, at 98. For a 
distillation of the conventional wisdom that Cushing was acting Chief Justice while Jay was in England, 
that he continued in that role while the chief justiceship remained vacant, and that he thus did not 
actually act as Chief Justice under his appointment to that post in January 1796, see Flanders, supra 
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 Thus, in naming Ellsworth Chief Justice, Washington was trying a third time to 
fill the vacancy left by Jay’s resignation, and to put behind him and the nation the 
embarrassments of the Rutledge recess appointment and the short-lived Cushing 
appointment.
 Ellsworth proved a sound choice to fill the vacant Chief Justiceship. As Chief 
Justice, he led his colleagues in consolidating the work of the Court under his 
predecessors,23 and indeed Ellsworth seems to have been a key architect of the 
abandonment of the Court’s original practice of seriatim written opinions in favor of 
one opinion for the Court—an achievement often attributed to John Marshall.24 
Under Ellsworth’s stewardship, few cases of note came before the Justices—a 
circumstance, of course, over which neither Ellsworth nor his colleagues had any 
control. Four cases stand out, however, from the work of the Ellsworth Court, 
suggesting that the federal judiciary was indeed justifying its existence as a part of 
the federal constitutional system: Hylton v. United States (1796), in which the Justices 
upheld a federal tax on carriages, noting by implication that if they had found the 
statute invalid, they would have struck it down as unconstitutional;25 Hollingsworth 
v. Virginia (1798), rejecting an attempt to invalidate the Eleventh Amendment 
because it had not been signed by President George Washington before being sent to 
the states (thereby confirming that a President has no required part to play in the 
Constitution’s amending process);26 Calder v. Bull (1798), holding that the 
constitutional ban on ex post facto laws applied only to criminal and not to civil 
statutes;27 and New York v. Connecticut (1799), the first lawsuit between two states 
that the Court heard in its original jurisdiction.28
 Adams’s dealings with Ellsworth had been few but cordial. Ellsworth administered 
the constitutional oath of office to Adams at his inaugural on March 4, 1797; thus, 
Adams was the first President to be sworn in by a Chief Justice, and Ellsworth was 
note 15, at 46–48. Flanders also reports the story of Washington’s announcement of Cushing’s 
appointment at a state dinner. See also Wexler, supra note 2, at 1387 n.65 (citing George Van Santvoord, 
Sketches of the Lives and Judicial Services of the Chief-Justices of the United States 245 
n.* (1854)). Also see Wexler’s cogent and persuasive analysis in id., at 1386–89, pointing out among other 
inconvenient facts that there is no evidence that Cushing was ever sworn in as Chief Justice.
23. The best treatment of the Ellsworth Court is Casto, supra note 12. See also Seriatim, supra note 12; 3 
DHSC, supra note 9 (dealing with the Justices on circuit 1795–1800); 5 DHSC, supra note 9 (discussing 
suits against states); 7 DHSC, supra note 9 (dealing with cases 1796–1797); 8 DHSC, supra note 9 
(dealing with cases 1798–1800); Goebel, supra note 11.
24. For a valuable treatment of this point, see Wexler, supra note 2, at 1412–18 (discussing the tendency to 
award the credit for this innovation to Marshall instead of Ellsworth). A noteworthy example of the 
tendency to credit Marshall with inventing the opinion for the Court is George Lee Haskins & Herbert 
A. Johnson, Foundations of Judicial Power: John Marshall, 1801–1815, in 2 The Oliver Wendell 
Holmes Devise History of the Supreme Court of the United States 382–83 (Paul A. Freund 
ed., 1981).
25. Hylton v. United States, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 171 (1796).
26. Hollingsworth v. Virginia, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 378 (1798).
27. Calder v. Bull, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 386 (1798).
28. New York v. Connecticut, 4 U.S. 1 (1799).
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the first Chief Justice to swear in a President. They had first met in the Senate in 
1789, when Adams was the first vice president and Ellsworth was one of the first 
Senators from Connecticut. In the turbulent political strife of the late 1790s, in which 
the nation witnessed tense relations not only between the partisan alliances of the 
Federalists and the Republicans, but internal bickering between Adams Federalists 
loyal to the President and so-called High Federalists loyal to Alexander Hamilton, 
Ellsworth aligned himself with the Adams Federalists, and preferred to seek 
compromise and conciliation rather than engage in political brawling.29
 In 1799, while Hamilton and his allies were engaged in preparing the United 
States for what they both feared and hoped would be an all-out war with France, 
Adams grew to distrust the motives and loyalties of his Cabinet—specifically 
Secretary of State Timothy Pickering and Secretary of War James McHenry, both of 
whom he suspected of being aligned with Hamilton rather than himself.30 Having 
learned from the American minister resident at The Hague, William Vans Murray, 
that France was making confidential overtures to seek a peaceful resolution of the 
differences between the two nations and an end to the so-called “quasi-war,” Adams 
secretly authorized Murray to pursue this prospect for peace.31 In February 1799, he 
named Murray as American minister plenipotentiary to France—and did so without 
prior consultation with his Cabinet. Angered Federalists in the Senate blocked 
Murray’s nomination, leading to a confrontation between the President and key 
Senators that degenerated into a shouting match. The only way to resolve the 
differences between the Federalist factions was to name a mission of three diplomats. 
Murray would be one. Adams wanted to name Ellsworth and Patrick Henry as the 
second and third members of the team, but Henry declined, and the fallback choice 
was Governor William Richardson Davie of North Carolina. Although Ellsworth 
was already apprehensive about the effects of a trans-Atlantic voyage and European 
travel on his health, he told President Adams to “disregard any supposed pains or 
perils that might attend me from a voige at one season more than another.”32
 After months of difficult and frustrating negotiations, Ellsworth, Murray, and 
Davie concluded the Convention of 1800 (also known as the Treaty of Mortefontaine 
for the place where the diplomats signed it). This agreement ended hostilities between 
France and the United States and abrogated the Franco-American alliance of 1778, 
which had been vital to the success of the Revolution, but was now more of an 
29. Casto, Oliver Ellsworth: “I Have Sought the Felicity and Glory of Your Administration,” supra note 15, at 311.
30. On the strife between Adams and key members of his Cabinet, which culminated in Adams forcing 
Secretary of War James McHenry to resign and firing Secretary of State Timothy Pickering, see, e.g., 
Ferling, supra note 4, at 390–93. For Pickering’s perspective, see Gerald Clarfield, Timothy 
Pickering and the American Republic 180–218 (1980). On the continuing acrimony between 
Adams and Pickering, even after both of them had retired from active service in public life, see Freeman, 
supra note 8, at 113, 132, 137, 151–52, 156–57, 280, 316, 317 n.13, 324 n.102, 325 nn.116 & 118.
31. Peter P. Hill, William Vans Murray Federalist Diplomat: The Shaping of Peace with 
France 1797–1801 (1971).
32. Casto, Oliver Ellsworth: “I Have Sought the Felicity and Glory of Your Administration,” supra note 15, at 311 
(quoting Oliver Ellsworth to John Adams on Sept. 26, 1799).
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embarrassment than an advantage to both nations. It also provided that each nation 
would give the other “most favored nation” trading status (that is, that each nation 
would extend to the other the most favorable terms governing commercial exchanges 
granted to any other nation); provided for the return by each side to the other of 
public ships captured during the quasi-war; guaranteed free passage for all goods and 
passports; established more flexible arrangements in case of future hostilities between 
the two nations, including the renunciation of each nation’s authority to freeze assets 
owned by citizens of the other nation; recognized French fishing rights off the waters 
of Newfoundland and the Gulf of St. Lawrence; and required privateers of each 
nation to carry the equivalent of insurance to provide compensation for any unlawful 
future damage inflicted on the other nation’s shipping.33
 Thus, it was with considerable satisfaction that Ellsworth wrote home to 
President Adams reporting the negotiation of this treaty, while also submitting his 
resignation on the grounds of illness. As he advised Adams, the state of his health 
prevented his quick return to the United States; he did not return to Connecticut 
until early 1801. Thereafter, he spent his time in retirement, with one brief stint as a 
member of the state’s Governor’s Council. He died in his home town of Windsor, on 
November 26, 1807.34
IV. PRESIDENT ADAMS AND CHIEF JUSTICE (?) CUSHING
 The timing of Ellsworth’s resignation gave Adams an opportunity, while also 
posing three problems. By naming a new Chief Justice, Adams could shape the 
development of the Court and the constitutional system. First, however, the 
rancorous, divided Federalists in the Senate would have to confirm his nominee. Not 
only did many of the Federalist Senators blame Adams for their rout at the polls—
they had long been split on almost every issue between those loyal to Hamilton and 
those loyal to Adams.35 Second, as already noted, the federal judiciary was a 
constitutional orphan—lacking respect, denounced as partisan, and mocked as 
unnecessary. Would the Senate deem the need to fill the vacancy created by 
Ellsworth’s resignation important enough to act on with dispatch? Third, Adams 
only had a few weeks to choose a nominee, lest the task of filling the Chief Justiceship 
fall to the incoming Republican President (either Jefferson or Burr)—a prospect that 
33. Convention Between the French Republic and the United States of America, U.S.-Fr., Sept. 30, 1800, 
8 Stat. 178 (1778–1845). To view the text of the Convention of 1800, see 2 Treaties and Other 
International Acts of the United States of America: Documents 1–40, 1776–1818, at 457–87 
(Hunter Miller ed., 1931) (including both French and English texts); 7 Treaties and Other 
International Agreements of the United States of America 1776–1949: Denmark–France 
801–11 (Charles L. Bevans ed., 1971) (providing the English-language text only); France—Convention 
of 1800: Text of the Treaty, The Avalon Project, http://avalon.law.yale.edu/19th_century/fr1800.asp 
(last visited Nov. 20, 2012) (providing the English-language text based on the Hunter Miller version). 
On the mission generally, see Stephen G. Kurtz, The French Mission of 1799–1800: Concluding Chapter in 
the Statecraft of John Adams, 80 Pol. Sci. Q. 543 (1965).
34. Casto, Oliver Ellsworth: “I Have Sought the Felicity and Glory of Your Administration,” supra note 15, at 
312–15; 2 Flanders, supra note 15, at 264–76.
35. Dauer, supra note 5, passim; Kurtz, supra note 5, passim.
452
PRESIDENT JOHN ADAMS AND FOUR CHIEF JUSTICES: AN ESSAY FOR JAMES F. SIMON NEW YORK LAW SCHOOL LAW REVIEW VOLUME 57 | 2012/13
both President Adams and the Senate’s Federalist majority viewed with alarm, 
however much they might have disagreed on other matters.
 One way to avoid a confirmation battle would be to promote a sitting Associate 
Justice to preside over the Court. If Adams were to choose a sitting Justice to take 
Ellsworth’s place, Cushing, the Court’s senior Justice, had the inside track—even 
though, as noted above, Cushing had turned down appointment to the Chief 
Justiceship in 1796 and none of the reasons that he had cited for doing so had 
changed in the ensuing four years. As 1800 faded into 1801, Cushing still suffered 
from all the debilities that he had cited to President Washington to explain his 
refusal of the Chief Justiceship: he was elderly (at sixty-eight, three years older than 
Adams himself) and of frail and failing health. Although Adams was aware that 
many Federalists expected him to name Cushing to succeed Ellsworth, the President 
doubted whether the elderly, fragile jurist could stand the stress of leading the Court 
or whether, after a few years, he would die or resign, leaving a vacancy to be filled by 
a Republican President.36
 The Associate Justice next in seniority, William Paterson of New Jersey, was 
another often-mentioned candidate for the Chief Justiceship. Like Ellsworth, 
Paterson had been a framer of the Constitution and of the Judiciary Act of 1789 (as 
one of New Jersey’s first Senators); in addition, he had been his state’s attorney 
general and was a respected jurist who was engaged in revising New Jersey’s laws 
while serving on the Court.37 Many Federalists favored Paterson over Cushing, 
including many in the Senate (who knew and respected Paterson as a former 
colleague)—but Adams worried that, were he to bypass Cushing to nominate 
Paterson, he would offend Cushing.38
 No other sitting Associate Justice seemed a likely candidate for promotion to 
Chief Justice, which simplified the conundrum somewhat. Yet, as Adams realized, 
naming a sitting Justice such as Cushing or Paterson to succeed Ellsworth would 
create more problems regarding judicial appointments. Promoting a sitting Justice 
would require the appointment of a new Associate Justice to fill the resulting vacancy. 
Would the Senate be able or willing to confirm two appointments to the Court in the 
short time before its session ended? Indeed, would Adams be able to find a candidate 
for the new vacancy on the Court should he name Cushing or Paterson Chief Justice? 
And if by choosing Paterson he so offended Cushing that Cushing resigned from the 
Court, Adams would have two vacancies to fill besides the Chief Justiceship.
 While Adams pondered his options, Thomas Boylston Adams, his youngest son 
and a newly-minted lawyer, wrote to him from Philadelphia to convey a message 
36. Turner, supra note 2, at 150–51, reprinted in Preyer Essays, supra note 2, at 46–47.
37. On Paterson, see John E. O’Connor, William Paterson, Lawyer and Statesman 1745–1806 
(1979); Daniel E. Degnan, S.J., William Paterson: Small States’ Nationalist, in Seriatim, supra note 12, 
at 231–59; R.B. Bernstein, William Paterson: Conservative Revolutionary in an Age of Crisis, Garden 
State Legacy (Dec. 2011), http://gardenstatelegacy.com/files/William_Paterson_A_Conservative_
Revolutionary_in_an_Age_of_Crisis_Bernstein_GSL14.pdf. See also the documentation of Paterson’s 
appointment in 1 DHSC, supra note 9, at 87–93.
38. Turner, supra note 2, at 151 n.36, reprinted in Preyer Essays, supra note 2, at 46 & n.36.
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from Jared Ingersoll, the U.S. Attorney for the District of Pennsylvania. Ingersoll 
was a distinguished Federalist who had been a quiet delegate to the Federal 
Convention of 1787, and was a recognized leader of the bar of the nation’s largest 
city. Shaken by the electoral rout of 1800, Ingersoll wanted to resign his office rather 
than await removal by the incoming Republican administration. Adams told his son 
to ask Ingersoll to delay his resignation until at least March 3, 1801 (Adams’s last day 
in office), while also instructing Thomas to sound out Ingersoll about his availability 
for another appointment. Adams then awaited word whether Ingersoll would be 
willing to join the Court as its newest Associate Justice, meaning that he would have 
a candidate on hand to fill the vacancy created by promoting Cushing or Paterson. 
Father and son exchanged letters for weeks thereafter, with the President pressing his 
son for an answer and Thomas reporting with frustration that Ingersoll was unwilling 
to commit himself.39
V. PRESIDENT ADAMS AND THE ONCE (AND FUTURE?) CHIEF JUSTICE JAY
 Adams therefore proceeded on two tracks in the winter of 1800–1801. While 
monitoring Thomas Boylston Adams’s struggle to extract a definite answer from 
Ingersoll, he also looked outside the Court to find a plausible candidate for Chief 
Justice, a course of action that would not require finding a second nominee to the 
Court. Adams wanted not only a distinguished jurist, but a man who could unite the 
fractious Federalists in the Senate behind his appointment. Adams therefore decided 
to bring back to national politics a man who had worked with him to negotiate the 
Treaty of Paris of 1783 that ended the American Revolution, a man who had been 
the first Chief Justice of the United States and also had served as governor of New 
York, and a man who could bring together the various factions of the Federalists in 
his support: John Jay. Gifted with diplomatic skill, legal ability, and political stature, 
Jay was fifty-five, ten years younger than Adams, and thus was likely to serve for 
longer than Cushing could. And, with the second term of his governorship drawing 
to a close, he might well be available to accept a well-paying, distinguished federal 
post that he would be able to hold for the rest of his life.
 Adams also knew, however, that there was no guarantee that Jay would accept 
reappointment to the Court. Jay’s years of service under the Articles of Confederation 
and the Constitution had left him weary and frustrated. From 1784 through 1789, 
Jay had served as Secretary for Foreign Affairs, having succeeded his fellow New 
Yorker Robert R. Livingston. At that time, Jay had set as a condition of accepting 
the post that Congress must return the seat of government to New York City, his 
home town. Before this appointment, Jay had spent the early 1780s on diplomatic 
missions in Spain and France; now he wanted to be close to his wife, Sarah Livingston 
39. Turner, supra note 2, at 147–49, reprinted in Preyer Essays, supra note 2, at 43–45. Once Adams named 
Marshall to the Chief Justiceship, there was no longer the prospect of a further vacancy on the Supreme 
Court, and Adams turned his attention instead to wooing Ingersoll as a candidate for one of the new 
federal circuit court judgeships. Ingersoll ultimately declined. See Robert J. Lukens, Note, Jared 
Ingersoll ’s Rejection of Appointment as One of the Midnight Judges of 1801: Foolhardy or Farsighted?, 70 
Temp. L. Rev. 189 (1997).
454
PRESIDENT JOHN ADAMS AND FOUR CHIEF JUSTICES: AN ESSAY FOR JAMES F. SIMON NEW YORK LAW SCHOOL LAW REVIEW VOLUME 57 | 2012/13
Jay, and his children, in his home town of New York City—and Congress was so 
desperate for a reliable Secretary of Foreign Affairs that it accepted his demand. Jay 
found the Secretaryship vexing, especially when, in 1786, he had sought congressional 
authorization to negotiate a commercial treaty with Spain by making a tactical 
concession of American rights to gain access to the lower Mississippi River and the 
port of New Orleans, then under Spanish control. Suspicious of his motives and 
scenting bias on Jay’s part in favor of the commercial northeastern states, the delegates 
from the five Southern states made clear that they would block any attempt to ratify 
any treaty that Jay negotiated on his proposed terms. This debacle confirmed Jay’s 
sour view of the Confederation and his commitment to national constitutional 
reform, a position that he held throughout 1787 and 1788, during the framing and 
adoption of the Constitution. Indeed, it was Jay’s shrewd, diplomatic efforts at the 
New York ratifying convention in 1788, at least as much as the oratorical pyrotechnics 
of his colleague Alexander Hamilton, that helped secure New York’s ratification of 
the Constitution.40 Moreover, Jay’s Address to the People of the State of New-York proved 
far more popular and effective as a pro-Constitution pamphlet than the two stout 
volumes of essays known as The Federalist.
 In 1789, President Washington offered Jay his choice of positions in the new 
government. Rather than take the office of Secretary of State, the institutional 
successor to the Secretaryship for Foreign Affairs, Jay accepted appointment as the 
first Chief Justice of the United States. Again, however, Jay found his new post more 
vexing than gratifying.
 In 1795, after nearly six years as Chief Justice, Jay left the High Court, feeling 
bitterness about his time there, and for good reason. As the first Justices of the new 
Supreme Court, Jay and his colleagues were victims of widespread suspicion of efforts 
to create an independent federal judiciary. The need to allay these suspicions strongly 
influenced the creators of the Judiciary Act of 1789. The framers of the 1789 Act 
created a system of lower federal courts dividing the nation into three judicial circuits. 
Justices would ride from state to state, holding circuit courts in their assigned circuits, 
sitting in each state’s circuit court with each state’s federal district judge. This system of 
circuit-riding would give the Justices something to do while waiting for the new federal 
judicial system to generate an appellate workload for the Supreme Court.41 These trial 
courts were the workhorses of the federal judicial system, becoming the principal 
means by which the federal government had direct contact with the American people.42 
40. Richard B. Morris, John Jay and the Adoption of the Federal Constitution in New York: A New Reading of 
Persons and Events, 63 N.Y. Hist. 133 (1982).
41. See Joshua Glick, On the Road: The Supreme Court and the History of Circuit Riding, 24 Cardozo L. Rev. 
1753 (2003), for a valuable history of circuit-riding. See id. at 1756–61 for a discussion of justifications 
for the 1789 statute on circuit-riding. See 2 DHSC, supra note 9 (dealing with the Justices on circuit 
between 1790 and 1794); 3 DHSC, supra note 9 (dealing with the Justices on circuit between 1789 and 
1800); 4 DHSC, supra note 9 (dealing with efforts between 1789 and 1801 to organize and reorganize 
the federal judiciary).
42. Ralph Lerner, The Supreme Court as Republican Schoolmaster, 1967 Sup. Ct. Rev. 127 (1967), reprinted in 
Ralph Lerner, The Thinking Revolutionary: Principle and Practice in the New Republic 
91 (1987).
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Riding circuit, however, was onerous and sometimes potentially life-threatening. 
Justice James Iredell, who was repeatedly assigned to the Southern Circuit, complained 
that the assignment required him to travel 1500 miles twice a year over bad roads on 
horseback. Iredell died suddenly in Edenton, North Carolina, on October 20, 1799, at 
the age of forty-nine; later scholars have attributed his demise to the toll that circuit-
riding exacted on him.43 So, too, while riding circuit in the winter of 1800, Justice 
Samuel Chase fell off his horse and nearly drowned as he tried to ford the Susquehanna 
River.44 Jay and his colleagues made repeated attempts to lobby Congress and President 
Washington for judicial reform, but Congress seemed indifferent to the Court’s 
plight—a circumstance that infuriated the Justices and left Jay, in particular, with few 
illusions about how little value anyone put on the federal judiciary.45
 Jay and his brethren suffered from more than the burdens of circuit-riding. In 
1798, the ratification of the Eleventh Amendment to the Constitution represented 
an extraordinary rebuke to the Court. This amendment overturned perhaps the Jay 
Court’s most important case interpreting the Constitution—Chisholm v. Georgia 
(1793), which, by a vote of four to one, upheld the right of a citizen of one state to sue 
another state in federal court without that state’s consent.46 The issue raised by 
Chisholm might seem a technical matter of jurisdiction, but at the time it threatened 
to create a tidal-wave of litigation against the states in federal courts on a variety of 
grounds. The most threatening such ground was the prospect that former Loyalists, 
now refugees in Canada or Great Britain, might sue states to recover lands confiscated 
from them during the Revolution—lands that states had resold to enable more of 
their citizens to own land and thereby to qualify for voting and holding office, as 
well as to ease the demand for land. The threat that such lawsuits might destabilize 
the states’ new economic, social, and political orders was so terrifying that such 
leading Federalists as Alexander Hamilton had pledged during the ratification 
controversy of 1787–1788 that the federal courts never would hear such cases. As 
Justice James Iredell maintained in lonely, agitated dissent, Chisholm gave the lie to 
those assurances. Within weeks of receiving news of the Court’s decision in Chisholm, 
43. On Iredell’s travails, see Glick, supra note 41, at 1766 n.82, and sources cited therein; Dale Yurs, The 
Early Supreme Court and the Challenges of Circuit-Riding, 36 J. Sup. Ct. Hist. 181 (2011). See id., at 
184–86, 187, for much of the discussion on Iredell’s travels. For documentation of Iredell’s appointment, 
see 1 DHSC, supra note 9, at 60, 64–65, 68.
44. Letter from Samuel Chase to Hannah Chase (Feb. 4, 1800), in 1 DHSC, supra note 9, at 888–89. For 
documentation of Chase’s appointment, see id. at 110–14; James Haw et al., Story Patriot: The 
Life of Samuel Chase (1980); Stephen B. Presser, The Original Misunderstanding: The 
English, the Americans, and the Dialectic of Federalist Jurisprudence (1991).
45. On the Justices’ efforts to secure either reform or abolition of circuit-riding, see Glick, supra note 41, at 
1763–72, 1774–82; Wythe Holt, “The Federal Courts Have Enemies in All Who Fear Their Influence on 
State Objects”: The Failure to Abolish Supreme Court Circuit-Riding in the Judiciary Acts of 1792 and 1793, 36 
Buff. L. Rev. 301–40 (1987); Wexler, supra note 2, at 1410–12, and sources cited therein. For a 
discussion of an attempted radical reworking of the federal judiciary that failed, see Wythe Holt, 
“Federal Courts as the Asylum to Federal Interests”: Randolph’s Report, the Benson Amendment, and the 
“Original Understanding” of the Federal Judiciary, 36 Buff. L. Rev. 341 (1987).
46. Chisholm v. Georgia, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 419, 493 (1793). 
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four states petitioned Congress to adopt such an amendment, and Congress lost no 
time in acting on their demands. Although it is unclear when the states ratified the 
amendment, Secretary of State Timothy Pickering declared it ratified in 1798. The 
Eleventh Amendment not only overturned the Court’s decision in Chisholm, but did 
so by declaring that the Constitution should not and could never be interpreted in 
the way that Jay and all his colleagues, with the exception of Iredell, had read it: as 
an insult of epic proportions.47
 Nothing could be done to ease the pain of the rebuff to the Court embodied by 
the Eleventh Amendment, but Adams hoped that pending legislation reshaping the 
federal judiciary by abolishing circuit-riding might persuade Jay to accept 
reappointment as Chief Justice. What became the Judiciary Act of 1801 was the 
focus of heated debate in both houses of Congress; this statute would create new 
federal circuit courts to handle appeals from the specialized district courts and to 
deal with their own caseloads, leaving the Justices free to manage the Supreme 
Court’s appellate caseload and the few categories of cases that they could hear in the 
Court’s original jurisdiction. The bitterness of the debate raised worries about 
whether Congress would pass the measure and send it to President Adams for his 
signature before his term expired.48
 Meanwhile, on December 18, 1800, with wary hope, Adams sent Jay’s name to the 
Senate, which swiftly confirmed him the next day.49 Adams immediately sent word to 
Jay of his appointment in a heartfelt letter assuring Jay that in the present turbulent 
times, “nothing will cheer the hopes of the best men so much, as your acceptance of 
this appointment. You have now a great opportunity to render a most signal service to 
your Country. I therefore pray you most earnestly to consider of it seriously & accept 
it.”50 Adams also waxed eloquent in praise of Jay’s talents and abilities, hoping perhaps 
that such compliments would move Jay to return to the Court:
I had no permission from you to take this step but it appeared to me that 
providence had thrown in my way an opportunity not only of marking to the 
publick the spot where in my opinion the greatest mass of worth remained 
collected in one individual but of furnishing my Country with the best 
security its inhabitants afforded against the increasing dissolution of morals.51
47. On Chisholm v. Georgia and how the Eleventh Amendment overruled it, see Richard B. Bernstein, 
Amending America: If We Love the Constitution So Much, Why Do We Keep Trying to 
Change It? 48–70 (1993); Clyde F. Jacobs, The Eleventh Amendment and Sovereign Immunity 
1–74 (1972); David E. Kyvig, Explicit & Authentic Acts: Amending the U.S. Constitution 
1776–1995, at 112–14, 124–25 (1996); John V. Orth, The Judicial Power of the United States: 
The Eleventh Amendment in American History 21–22 (1987).
48. See Turner, supra note 2, at 149–50, reprinted in Preyer Essays, supra note 2, at 45–46. On this pivotal 
statute, see also Kathryn Turner, Federalist Policy and the Judiciary Act of 1801, 22 Wm. & Mary Q. 3 
(1965), reprinted in Preyer Essays, supra note 2, at 10–38.
49. For documentation, see 1 DHSC, supra note 9, at 144–45.
50. Letter from John Adams to John Jay (Dec. 19, 1800), in 1 DHSC, supra note 9, at 145–46.
51. Id.
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 As he admitted in his letter, however, Adams had never asked Jay whether he 
would accept reappointment as Chief Justice. Adams’s critics cite this oversight as an 
example of his habit of making appointments and other decisions impulsively52—and 
yet this was precisely the course of action that Washington had followed in January 
1796 in naming Cushing as Chief Justice. Over the next two weeks, Adams pondered 
what Jay would do; in the meantime, he continued to seek potential candidates to fill 
a new vacancy on the Court should Jay decline and Adams have to return to his 
previous plan of naming Cushing or Paterson to the Chief Justiceship. Another 
consideration weighing on Adams was the fractious congressional debate over the 
Judiciary Act of 1801; its fate might determine whether Adams would have to appoint 
a sitting Justice to the Chief Justiceship or look outside the Court if Jay said no.53
 On January 2, 1801, Jay wrote to Adams refusing his appointment; Adams 
received the letter about two weeks later.54 Jay balanced between expressing warm 
feelings for his old colleague and venting his dislike for how badly the nation was 
treating its new court system. Calm, decisive, and icy-cold in his assessment of the 
post offered to him, Jay made clear that he had no faith in efforts at judicial reform—
the argument that Adams had hoped might bring Jay around to accepting 
reappointment to the Court. Jay reminded Adams that the Judiciary Act of 1789, 
which created circuit-riding, was shaped more by “certain Prejudices and Sensibilities, 
than . . . the great and obvious Principles of sound Policy.”55 He added that ten years 
of hopes for reform “have not been realized; nor have we hitherto seen convincing 
Indications of a Disposition in Congress to realize them.”56 Jay did not mention, 
among the many slights that the judiciary received at congressional hands, the 
adoption of the Eleventh Amendment, but he did not have to do so. Both men 
recognized the amendment as a stinging blow to the Court.
 Jay ended his letter with a blunt summation of his reasons for refusing his 
appointment; his statement deserves extended quotation:
I left the Bench perfectly convinced that under a System so defective it would 
not obtain the Energy, weight, and Dignity which are essential to its affording 
due support to the national Government; nor acquire the public Confidence 
and Respect which, as the last Resort of the Justice of the nation, it should 
possess. Hence I am induced to doubt both the Propriety and the Expediency 
of my returning to the Bench under the present System; especially as it would 
52. See, e.g., Clare Cushman, Courtwatchers: Eyewitness Accounts in Supreme Court History 
10 (2011); Turner, supra note 2, at 144, reprinted in Preyer Essays, supra note 2, at 40. See also the 
examples cited infra note 66.
53. See Turner, supra note 2, at 158–60, reprinted in Preyer Essays, supra note 2, at 53–55.
54. See 4 John Jay, The Correspondence and Public Papers of John Jay §§ 284–85 (Henry P. Johnson 
ed., Da Capo Press, reprint 1971) (1890–1893) [hereinafter Papers of John Jay], reprinted in 1 DHSC, 
supra note 9, at 146–47.
55. 1 DHSC, supra note 9, at 146; 4 Papers of John Jay, supra note 54, at 285.
56. 1 DHSC, supra note 9, at 146; 4 Papers of John Jay, supra note 54, at 285.
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give some Countenance to the neglect and indifference with which the opinions 
and Remonstrances of the Judges on this important Subject have been treated.57
 Perhaps realizing that he had been uncharacteristically undiplomatic, Jay 
concluded his letter by acknowledging his sense of public obligation; at the same 
time, he concluded, he could not overlook that “the state of my health removes every 
doubt, it being clearly and decidedly incompetent to the fatigues incident to the 
office.”58 Even in reference to an ostensibly private reason for refusing reappointment, 
the New Yorker could not forbear pointing out the taxing effects of being Chief 
Justice (including the ordeal of circuit-riding).
 Even while awaiting Jay’s reply to news of his reappointment to the Chief 
Justiceship, Adams half-expected him to decline, but he had confided in nobody, not 
even his wife and closest political advisor, Abigail Adams, how likely it was that Jay 
would refuse reappointment or what Adams might do in that case.59 The historical 
record offers conflicting evidence of Adams’s thinking as he awaited Jay’s response. 
There are some indications that he actually was returning to the previous option of 
naming a sitting member of the Court to succeed Ellsworth and then naming a new 
Justice to fill that vacancy, or accepting the idea f loated in Congress, then in the 
midst of drafting the Judiciary Act of 1801, that it would be wise to shrink the 
Court’s membership to five, relieving Adams of the burden of making two 
appointments to the Court—as well as leaving no vacancy for his successor to fill. 
All the while, Adams was working side-by-side with Secretary of State John 
Marshall—and taking Marshall’s measure.
Vi. prEsidEnt adaMs and ChiEf JUstiCE MarshaLL
 As of January 1801, John Marshall had served as John Adams’s Secretary of State 
for a little less than a year, but he had already won the President’s confidence and 
liking. Marshall was born in Virginia in 1755 and, at the age of twenty, commanded 
a unit of Virginia militia during the opening months of the Revolution. Starting his 
military career as a lieutenant in a local regiment known as the Culpeper Minutemen, 
he enlisted in the Continental Army and became first a lieutenant and then a captain 
of the Eleventh Virginia Continental Regiment. Serving under George Washington 
at Valley Forge, the young Marshall swiftly formed a deep admiration for his fellow 
Virginian. After the war’s end, Marshall studied for the Virginia bar, including six 
months of lectures by George Wythe at the College of William and Mary. In 1780, 
Marshall received his law license, bearing the signature of Virginia’s governor, 
Thomas Jefferson—a notable historical irony, in light of events some thirty years 
later that would pit Marshall, then Chief Justice, against President Jefferson.60
57. 1 DHSC, supra note 9, at 147; 4 Papers of John Jay, supra note 54, at 285.
58. 1 DHSC, supra note 9, at 147; 4 Papers of John Jay, supra note 54, at 285–86.
59. See Turner, supra note 2, at 146, 149, reprinted in Preyer Essays, supra note 2, at 42, 44–45.
60. David Robarge, A Chief Justice’s Progress: John Marshall from Revolutionary Virginia to 
the Supreme Court 55 (2000). This and the following five paragraphs of this article are based on this 
fine but neglected monograph. For authoritative studies of Marshall’s life, see the dated but still useful 
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 Launching himself as an attorney, Marshall soon had a wide-ranging and varied 
law practice. Like most other attorneys of his time, he focused on such issues as 
property disputes, controversies over land titles, and will and estate contests. In 1788, 
his strong support for reforming the general government led him to join the 
Federalists in backing the proposed Constitution. Elected as a Federalist delegate 
from Henrico County to Virginia’s ratifying convention in Richmond, he joined 
forces with such leading Federalists as James Madison and George Wythe, speaking 
with particular effectiveness in defense of the Constitution’s Article III, which 
authorized an independent federal court system headed by “one Supreme Court.”61
 Following the Constitution’s ratification, and despite the praise he received for his 
efforts in the Virginia ratification contest, Marshall navigated increasingly troubled 
political waters. Most Virginia politicians opposed the fiscal policies proposed and 
advocated by Washington’s Secretary of the Treasury, Alexander Hamilton; thus, 
Marshall became more and more prominent among the slowly dwindling band of 
Virginia’s Federalists—even though, in 1791, he chose to retire from public life to 
practice law, speculate in western lands, and care for his ailing wife.
 From 1791 to 1797, however, despite his intentions, Marshall found himself 
shuttling once more between private and public life. The demands of his growing law 
practice clashed with his political sympathies, for he often represented Virginia 
debtors seeking to evade the claims of American and British creditors, or to defend 
Virginia statutes easing debtors’ burdens in the face of the Constitution and national 
treaties. In 1796, he argued his only case as an attorney before the U.S. Supreme 
Court—Ware v. Hylton, which he lost decisively.62 In that case, Marshall sought to 
defend a Virginia statute authorizing confiscation by the state of debts owed to British 
subjects. Despite his efforts, which won admiration for his eloquence and his masterly 
legal analysis of the questions presented, the Supreme Court struck down the statute 
on which he and his client relied, holding that it violated the ban on such statutes by 
the Treaty of Paris of 1783, and thus the Constitution’s Supremacy Clause.
 In the late 1790s, Marshall was returning to prominence as a Southern Federalist, 
emerging as second only to Washington himself in Virginia. Indeed, as the Federalists 
increasingly became a regional rather than a national political force (with its center of 
gravity in New England), Marshall’s standing helped vault him into national 
prominence. Nonetheless, in 1795 he turned down Washington’s offer to name him 
Attorney General of the United States; in 1796, he again turned down another bid 
by Washington to bring him into the administration, this time as American minister 
to France; and in 1798, he declined appointment to the Supreme Court (to succeed 
James Wilson, who had undergone a spectacular self-destruct under the twin 
pressures of financial ruin and failing health). Instead, Marshall recommended that 
Albert J. Beveridge, The Life of John Marshall (1916); see also Charles F. Hobson, The 
Great Chief Justice: John Marshall and the Rule of Law (1996); R. Kent Newmyer, John 
Marshall and the Heroic Age of the Supreme Court (2001); and Jean Edward Smith, John 
Marshall: Definer of a Nation (1996).
61. For a valuable discussion, see Robarge, supra note 60, at 106–12, and sources cited therein.
62. Ware v. Hylton, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 199 (1796).
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President John Adams name his good friend Bushrod Washington, who was the 
former President’s nephew—a recommendation that Adams followed.63 (Later, 
Justice Washington would repay the favor by asking Marshall to write the authorized 
biography of George Washington.64)
 In 1797, however, he did accept a federal appointment from President Adams. 
When he was named, with Charles C. Pinckney and Elbridge Gerry, to undertake a 
special diplomatic mission to ease tensions between the United States and France, 
the appointment launched a vital episode in his life—cementing his national 
reputation, bolstering his status as a Federalist, and, above all, commending him to 
the attention of President Adams, a man not given to undue fondness for Virginians. 
Marshall and his colleagues had barely arrived in France before they confronted 
three French diplomats, who demanded bribes for themselves and other officials as 
the price of negotiations. When the Americans indignantly refused, the mission 
failed. Marshall returned home with the diplomats’ report documenting the French 
demand for bribes, which President Adams then released with shrewd timing and 
spectacular political effect. The Americans’ defense of their national honor against 
French insults in the so-called XYZ Affair made Marshall a national hero. Following 
his return to America, Marshall continued to rise within the Federalists’ fractious 
ranks, esteemed by both High Federalists and Adams Federalists, yet unswerving in 
his support for President Adams. Following the President’s purge of High Federalists 
from his Cabinet in 1800, he first named Marshall Secretary of War and then 
Secretary of State. Thus, when Adams had to deal with the conundrum of whom to 
name to the Chief Justiceship of the United States, he had Marshall by his side.
 In an autobiographical sketch written over twenty years later at the request of his 
friend and colleague Justice Joseph Story, Marshall recalled what happened when 
Adams received Jay’s letter refusing reappointment to the Court.65 On reading the 
letter, Adams declared to Marshall, “Mr. Jay has declined his appointment.” Then he 
asked, “Whom shall I nominate now?” Marshall suggested Paterson, aware that 
most Federalist Senators leaned toward the New Jerseyan, but Adams dismissed the 
idea “in a decided tone.” Adams then looked at Marshall and said, “I believe that I 
must nominate you.” A surprised but gratified Marshall accepted Adams’s decision 
to name him the nation’s highest ranking judge.
 Adams’s choice of Marshall might look like one of those impulsive acts so often 
denounced by Adams’s critics,66 but further examination of his choice makes clear 
63. On Bushrod Washington, see James R. Stoner, Jr., Heir Apparent: Bushrod Washington and Federal Justice 
in the Early Republic, in Seriatim, supra note 12, at 322–49.
64. Freeman, supra note 8, at 62–104. The original edition is John Marshall, The Life of George 
Washington (Philadelphia, C.P. Wayne, 1804–1807) (five vols.). A modern reprint of an 1838 one-
volume abridgment is John Marshall, The Life of George Washington: Special Edition for 
Schools (Robert Faulkner & Paul Carress eds., 2000) (1838).
65. See John Marshall, An Autobiographical Sketch (John Stokes Adams ed., 1937); 1 DHSC, supra 
note 9, at 928. For the documentation of Marshall’s appointment, see 1 DHSC, supra note 9, at 152–55.
66. Even the otherwise admiring John Patrick Diggins criticizes Adams for his erratic impulsiveness. John 
Patrick Diggins, John Adams 10 (2004). Alexander Hamilton denounced Adams’s tendency to 
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that he knew what he was doing, and that he chose well. Adams saw in Marshall a 
man only forty-five years old, healthy and vigorous, unlike Ellsworth or Cushing, 
and thus someone who would serve for a significant period as Chief Justice. Adams 
also knew that Marshall was a skilled lawyer and veteran diplomat, like Jay—
qualities that a new Chief Justice could draw on in winning his colleagues’ loyalty 
and support. Adams also valued Marshall’s popularity, rooted in his part in the XYZ 
Affair that had ignited the quasi-war with France. Finally, as a man who had endured 
much from subordinates and political allies whose loyalties were questionable, Adams 
knew that Marshall was a Federalist loyal to him rather than to the High Federalists.67
 The Senate received news of Adams’s nomination of Marshall with consternation. 
Adams’s choice left many Senate Federalists angry and shaken; most of them had 
backed Paterson and had assured him of their support. (Other Senators, disconcerted 
by Marshall’s relative youth, even expressed the private opinion that Adams should 
name himself Chief Justice.68) At first, some Senators who were enthusiasts for 
Paterson debated with one another the chances of forcing the President to their point 
of view by delaying or even rejecting Marshall’s nomination. But finally the Senators 
realized that they could not reject Marshall without risking an even more offensive 
appointment from Adams or risking that the new President, probably Thomas 
Jefferson, would choose the next Chief Justice. In addition, the pressure to complete 
the task of recasting the federal judiciary by enacting the Judiciary Act of 1801 made 
such a battle with the President pointless and destructive.69 So, despite their 
grumbling, they confirmed Marshall. Thus it was John Marshall who swore in his 
distant cousin, Thomas Jefferson, as President of the United States. And, ultimately 
John Marshall proved to be John Adams’s most enduring legacy as President.
Vii. COnCLUsiOn
 This story of President John Adams’s dealings with four Chief Justices is tangled 
and complex. It is a story, by turns, of the use of Justices as diplomats; of the politics 
of judicial selection; of the need for institutional reform; of the effects on laws of 
partisan strife; of the competing demands of public and private realms in a leading 
politician’s struggle to chart his own course; and ultimately of the roundabout and at 
times impulsive ways that Presidents establish their legacies and Supreme Court 
Justices get the chance to achieve greatness.
decide issues on “Impulse and Caprice.” Ferling, supra note 4, at 397; Kurtz, supra note 5, at 100. See 
also sources cited in note 52, supra. 
67. In addition to the sources cited in note 60, supra, see for excellent treatments of Marshall as Chief 
Justice, Herbert A. Johnson, The Chief Justiceship of John Marshall 1801–1835 (1998); 
Haskins & Johnson, supra note 24; G. Edward White, The Marshall Court and Cultural 
Change 1815–1835, in 3–4 The Oliver Wendell Holmes Devise History of the Supreme 
Court of the United States (Cambridge Univ. Press 2010) (1988).
68. Turner, supra note 2, at 158, reprinted in Preyer Essays, supra note 2, at 53–54.
69. Turner, supra note 2, at 160–62, reprinted in Preyer Essays, supra note 2, at 55–57.
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 Consider, for example, a few counterfactual situations70: What might have 
happened had Thomas Boylston Adams been able to give his father timely assurance 
that Jared Ingersoll would accept appointment as an Associate Justice? Such assurance 
might have led Adams to promote Cushing—or, had Cushing declined, Paterson—
to Chief Justice. Cushing as Chief Justice would have been a place-filling 
appointment, given that the stresses of being Chief Justice might have sapped 
Cushing’s strength so that he would have died even earlier than September 13, 1810 
(the date of his actual death). Such a scenario would have given the eventual 
Republican President, Thomas Jefferson, the chance to appoint a new Chief Justice—
perhaps William Johnson or Spencer Roane (often named as a candidate should 
Jefferson have the chance to name a Chief Justice). Cushing also might have declined 
Adams’s offer, repeating his conduct from 1796, in which case Adams might have 
turned to Paterson, a choice in line with the expectations and hopes of most Federalist 
Senators. Paterson, however, died on September 9, 1806, so he also would have been 
a place-holding appointment, again giving Jefferson the chance to name a Chief 
Justice to his liking.
 In any event, had Adams promoted either Cushing or Paterson to the Chief 
Justiceship and then named Ingersoll to fill the vacancy left by that promotion, we 
might not have had the landmark Marshall Court decisions that form the spine of 
any standard course in constitutional law. Nor might we have had Associate Justice 
Joseph Story, whom President James Madison appointed to the Court in 1812 to 
succeed Cushing after two previous nominees (Levi Lincoln, Jefferson’s Attorney 
General, and the diplomat and former Massachusetts Senator John Quincy Adams) 
had declined the appointment, and a third (Alexander Wolcott) had been rejected by 
the Senate.71 In turn, not having been named to the Court, it is not clear whether 
Story would have become the Dane Professor of Law at the Harvard Law School, 
nor whether he would have reshaped American law with the remarkable series of 
treatises on commercial and constitutional law growing out of his lectures at Harvard.
 And what would American constitutional law, not to mention the Supreme 
Court, have become under the leadership of Cushing or Paterson, and then of 
Johnson or Roane? Would it have set out to vindicate and define federal power to 
regulate interstate commerce, or to defend national supremacy over the states, as the 
Court did under Chief Justice Marshall’s leadership? Further, in a question indicating 
the frequent mingling of law and politics in the early Republic, would another Chief 
Justice have engaged in Marshall’s effort to separate law and politics and thereby to 
70. For an intriguing exploration of the value of counterfactual history, see Virtual History: 
Alternatives and Counterfactuals (Niall Ferguson ed., 1999); see also R.B. Bernstein, Review of 
Ferguson, Niall ed., Virtual History: Alternatives and Counterfactuals, H-Net (Jan. 2000), http://www.h-
net.org/reviews/showrev.php?id=3721.
71. See R. Kent Newmyer, Supreme Court Justice Joseph Story: Statesman of the Old Republic 
70–71 (G. Edward White ed., 1985); Morgan D. Dowd, Justice Joseph Story and the Politics of Appointment, 
9 Am. J. Legal Hist. 265–85 (1965).
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protect the Court and the federal bench from the vicissitudes of political change?72 
By contrast, had Marshall not been named to the Court, would he have been able to 
rekindle and redirect the energies of the demoralized Federalists and prevent them 
from dwindling into a purely sectional faction? Would the Federalists have found 
new inspiration and energy under the political leadership that Marshall could have 
offered them, perhaps even backing him for the presidency against Jefferson in 1804 
or Madison in 1808 or 1812?
 These counterfactual questions offer new confirmation of the truth of the oft-
quoted comment by Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., when, in 1901, as chief justice of 
the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court, he spoke at a court ceremony marking 
the centennial of Marshall’s appointment as Chief Justice:
A great man represents a great ganglion in the nerves of society, or, to vary 
the figure, a strategic point in the campaign of history, and part of his 
greatness consists in his being there. I can no more separate John Marshall 
from the fortunate circumstance that the appointment of Chief Justice fell to 
John Adams, instead of to Jefferson a month later, and so gave it to a Federalist 
and loose constructionist to start the workings of the Constitution, than I can 
separate the black line through which he sent his electric fire at Fort Wagner 
from Colonel Shaw.73
 Thomas Boylston Adams’s failure, despite his best efforts to nail down Jared 
Ingersoll’s candidacy for a seat on the Court, John Jay’s decision to forgo another 
bruising stint of public service, and John Adams’s willingness to seize on John 
Marshall’s availability all suggest that we must heed the lessons that Jim Simon 
teaches in his work on constitutional history. We must acknowledge—and be grateful 
for—the inf luence of the contingent and the unforeseen on the Supreme Court’s 
long and tortuous path from institutional irrelevance to judicial pre-eminence.
72. For this view of Marshall, see William E. Nelson, Marbury v. Madison: The Origins and Legacy 
of Judicial Review passim (2000); William E. Nelson, The Eighteenth-Century Background of John 
Marshall ’s Jurisprudence, 76 Mich. L. Rev. 893 (1978).
73. Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., Remarks of the Chief Justice of the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court (Feb. 
4, 1901), in 178 Massachusetts Reports: Cases Argued and Determined in the Supreme 
Judicial Court of Massachusetts, February 1901–May 1901, at 624–28 (1902).
